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Abstract
We propose a typology of representational artifacts for health care and life sciences domains and associate this typol-
ogy with different kinds of formal ontology and logic, drawing conclusions as to the strengths and limitations for 
ontology in a description logics framework.
The four types of domain representation we consider are: (i) lexico-semantic representation, (ii) representation of 
types of entities, (iii) representation of background knowledge, and (iv) representation of individuals.
We advocate a clear distinction between the four kinds of representation in order to provide a more rational basis 
for the use of ontologies and related artifacts in order to advance integration of data and enhance interoperability 
of associated reasoning systems.
We highlight the fact that only a minor portion of scientifically relevant facts in a domain such as biomedicine can 
be adequately represented by formal ontologies as long as the latter are conceived as representations of entity types. 
In particular, we show that the attempt to encode default or probabilistic knowledge using ontologies is prone to 
produce unintended, erroneous models. 
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Introduction
It is increasingly recognized that the complexity 
of the health care and life sciences domain demands 
consensus on the terms and language used in docu-
mentation and communication. This need is driven by 
the exponential growth of data generated by patient 
care and life science research. At the moment, this 
data cannot be fully exploited for integration, retrieval, 
or interoperability, because the underlying terminol-
ogy and classification systems (often subsumed under 
the heading “biomedical vocabularies”, see Table 1) 
are inadequate in various ways. Their heterogeneity 
reflects the different backgrounds, tasks and needs of 
different communities – including information technol-
ogy communities – and creates a serious obstacle to 
consistent data aggregation and interoperability of the 
sort demanded by biomedical research, health care, and 
translational medicine. 
Table 1 - Examples of biomedical vocabularies. Most of these vocabularies are made available through 
the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) Metathesaurus, an umbrella system covering a broad 
variety of biomedical terminology systems (NLMb 2008, McCray et al. 1995)
Vocabulary Purpose
ICD-9-CM/ICD-10 (WHO, 2008) disease classification, in health statistics, hospital billing
WHO Drug Dictionary (UMC, 2008),
drug classification
ATC (WHOCC, 2008),
RxNorm (NLMa, 2008)
DM+D (NHS, 2008)
NCI Thesaurus and Metathesaurus (NCI, 2008) cancer research
LOINC (REGENSTRIEF INSTITUTE, 2008) inter-laboratory communication
MedDRA (NORHTROP GRUMMAN, 2008) medicine-related regulatory activities
DICOM (MITA, 2008) medical image and imaging process descriptions
MeSH (NLM, 2008) medical literature indexing
SNOMED CT (IHTSDO, 2008) clinical documentation
Ontology and biomedical knowledge 
What were formerly referred to as “terminology 
systems” or “vocabularies” are today often called by the 
name “ontology”. This term first became common in 
biology circles with the success of the Gene Ontology 
(GO), and has become increasingly popular in the medi-
cal domain as well. The so-called “omics” disciplines are 
a further major driving force for their development and 
adoption. Within this context, the Open Biomedical 
Ontologies (OBO) initiative, with over 60 ontologies 
at the moment and building on the successes of GO, 
is becoming a standard resource for the annotation of 
biomedical research data (SMITH et al., 2007).
But the term “ontology” itself is notoriously ambig-
uous (KUSNIERCZYK, 2006). Users often tend to have 
unrealistic expectations as to what ontologies can achieve 
(STENZHORN et al., 2009). Therefore, any use of this 
term must be preceded by an explanation of its intended 
meaning. To illustrate the sorts of problems which can 
arise, we can point to the stark contrast between sample 
definitions developed by computer scientists and the 
ones inspired by philosophers:
− Ontology (Computer Science): An ontology 
defines (or specifies) the concepts, relationships, and 
other distinctions that are relevant for modeling a do-
main. The specification of an ontology takes the form of 
the definitions of representational vocabulary (classes, 
relations, and so forth) that provide meanings for the 
vocabulary and formal constraints on its coherent use 
(GRUBER, 1992).
− Ontology (Philosophy): Ontology is the study 
of what there is (QUINE, 1948). Formal ontologies 
are theories that attempt to give precise mathematical 
formulations of the properties and relations of certain 
entities (HOFWEBER, 2004).
Although these two definitions differ significantly, 
ontologies are seen in both cases as formal systems that 
apply fundamental principles and formalisms, drawing 
on mathematical logic to represent entities of certain 
kinds, whether on the side of mind and language (“con-
cepts”) or on the side of reality (“properties”, “types”, 
and “classes”). The major role of ontologies is in both 
cases to provide a system of domain-independent dis-
tinctions to structure domain-specific theories with the 
goal of integrating and retrieving data and fostering in-
teroperability. We are interested here only in ontologies 
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in which a formal approach is used to support an aim of 
this sort. To highlight this feature we shall use the term 
“formal ontology” in our deliberations henceforth. We 
believe that the focus on logical formalism most clearly 
distinguishes the new generation of biomedical ontolo-
gies — including SNOMED CT, and recent versions of 
the Gene Ontology (GO) — from their vocabulary-like 
predecessors, which still bear traces of their origins in the 
domain of library science and literature indexing.
In this paper we focus on the role formal ontology 
can play in resolving some of the problems caused by the 
heterogeneity of terminologies and classification systems 
used in the biomedical domain. We want to clarify how 
the representation of the entities studied by the life sci-
ences can benefit from formal ontologies in a way that 
will help more adequately to capture domain knowledge. 
We address two important aspects which are too seldom 
dealt with explicitly: (i) the representation of meta- or 
background knowledge, and (ii) the relation of ontologies 
to human language. We seek to highlight the role played 
by these factors in developing and using formal ontolo-
gies. We also seek to clarify those situations in which 
domain knowledge cannot be adequately accounted for 
by formal ontologies, especially for reasons of vagueness 
and uncertainty. Two questions arise at this point: 
− Which criteria can be used to delineate the types 
of knowledge that can sensibly be expressed by formal 
ontologies?
− How can the remaining types of knowledge be 
encoded to satisfy the demands of integration, retrieval, 
and interoperability?
We try to answer these questions focusing on rep-
resentation standards developed by the Semantic Web 
community. We give examples of the use of this formal-
ism for representing biomedical entities. We also point to 
some associated misconceptions and errors in ontology 
design and show how they can be rectified.
Informal representations 
A simple universal representation scheme that lends 
itself to a representation of a broad range of entities and 
relations between them is given by the so-called Object 
– Attribute – Value (OAV) triples. This encoding scheme 
was already popular in early expert systems (SHORT-
LIFFE et al., 1975) and currently plays an important 
role in the Semantic Web initiative (W3C, 2008) where 
it is known within the framework of the Resource De-
scription Format (RDF) under the heading of ‘Subject 
– Predicate – Object (SPO) triples’ (KLYNE et al., 2004). 
This triple-based representation is also very similar to 
the way the Unified Medical Language System (UMLS) 
Metathesaurus and other vocabulary resources link pairs 
of concepts by means of relations such as broader_than, 
narrower_than, part_of, mapped_to, is_a, and so on. Table 2 
gives some examples of this kind of representation.
Table 2 - Examples of OAV representations 
Concept / Term 1
(Object, Subject)
Relation
(Attribute, Predicate)
Concept / Term 2
(Value, Object)
Aspirin prevents Myocardial_Infarction
Aspirin is_a Sacicylate
Aspirin has_part Aromatic_Ring
Blood_Plasma narrower_than Blood
Cancer causes Weight_Loss
Cell has_part Cell_Membrane
Contraceptive_Measure prevents Pregnancy
Diabetes_Mellitus is_a Frequent_Disease
Diabetes_Mellitus has_prevalence 2.8%
Diclofenac has_side_effect Gastrointestinal_Bleeding
Diphteria is_a Rare_Disease
ELM-2 interacts_with LMO-2
ELM-2 is_a Protein
Fever symptom_of Malaria_Tropica
Hand has_part Thumb
Hepatitis has_location Liver
Hepatitis has_translation Hepatite
Hypertension is_a Cardiovascular_Risk_Factor
Hyperthermia has_synonym Fever
Liver is_a Bodily_Organ
NaCl_Solution has_part Cl-_Ion
Pharyngitis has_symptom Hyperthermia
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Smoking causes Cancer
THC is_a Schedule_III_Controlled_Drug
Thumb has_part Thumbnail
WHO located_in Geneva 
“Smoking causes cancer” is semantically meaningful. 
Without additional knowledge about how to interpret 
the relation causes, we cannot decide which alternative 
is meant in any given case. Certainly, in many everyday 
situations humans communicate perfectly well when 
using such ambiguous statements. But this is so because 
humans are able to associate them spontaneously with a 
relevant context of implicit background assumptions. In 
the case of machine processing such implicit knowledge 
is lacking, and it is for this reason that logical definitions 
and axioms expressed in an appropriate formal language 
are required to preclude, or at least constrain, competing 
interpretations. Unfortunately, as will be clear from the 
examples given below, application of the rigor of logic is 
not only very demanding of human resources, it is also 
such that it does not even in principle allow the formal 
expression of everything we know. We can however 
still capture an important part of our knowledge in a 
way that is, we believe, indispensable to computational 
reasoning and to advance integration, retrieval, and 
interoperability.
Formal representations 
To illustrate how basic ontological assertions con-
cerning the entities in a given domain can be formu-
lated using logical resources, we introduce the family 
of Description Logics (hereafter DLs) (BAADER et al., 
2007). DLs are subsets of first-order logic (hereafter 
FOL). Although DLs are far from being able to express 
everything one might desire from a comprehensive logi-
cally based ontology (for this one would require at least 
the full range of FOL), we set them as our focus here for 
the following reasons:
• DLs have recently become a standard for rep-
resenting domain knowledge in the context of the Se-
mantic Web, and OWL DL, the DL subtype of the Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) (PATEL-SCHNEIDER et 
al., 2004) has been developed and standardized by the 
World Web Wide Consortium (W3C). 
• DLs have a large user base and are supported by 
a variety of software tools, such as the Protégé editor 
(BMIR, 2008). OWL DL also supports the use of reason-
ing engines like Pellet (SIRIN et al., 2007) and FaCT++ 
(TSARKOV et al., 2006), which allow algorithmic check-
ing of the consistency of given inputs and the inference 
of new assertions. 
• DLs have certain favorable computational 
properties. Above all, many of them are decidable, i.e. 
algorithms exist for which it is guaranteed that they 
will always return some result. This is the reason why 
One advantage of the triple format becomes evident 
when looking at this table. Simple assertions are repre-
sented in a way which comes close to the expressions used 
in human language. One disadvantage is that it promotes 
a confusion of use and mention (because it is asserted 
that one and the same thing, for example Fever, is both a 
Synonym of Hyperthermia and a Symptom of Inflammation). 
The triple format creates difficulties also when it comes 
to the formulation of more complex assertions such as 
“In 2008, diabetes mellitus had a prevalence of 18.3% of 
US citizens age 60 and older”. Such assertions need to be 
split into sets of simpler assertions if they are to fit the 
triple format. Table 3 depicts one possible OAV represen-
tation of such an assertion, where the successive rows are 
joined together in a compound conjunctive statement. 
One drawback here is that many concurring models of 
this kind can claim to represent the given statement 
equally well, and this creates forking. Different model-
ers effectuate the needed encodings in different ways, 
and as a result their information systems are no longer 
marked by interoperability. To avoid this silo effect, a 
single uniform representation model is needed.
Table 3 - OAV triplet representation of the 
complex statement: “In 2008, diabetes mellitus 
had a prevalence of 18.3% of US citizens age 60 
and older”
Prevalence_1 instance_of Prevalence
Prevalence_1 has_date 2008
Prevalence_1 has_value 0.183
Prevalence_1 has_population Population_1
Prevalence_1 has_disease Diabetes_Mellitus
Population_1 instance_of Population
Population_1 has_minimum_age 60
Population_1 has_habitat USA
Another drawback of the OAV representation 
scheme is that it is not obvious, in any given case. how 
its assertions are to be interpreted. The assertion that 
Smoking causes Cancer, for example, could be interpreted 
in such a way that its author believes that smoking 
always (i.e., without exception) causes cancer. But it 
could also be interpreted to mean that smoking often, 
usually, or typically causes cancer, or even (as within 
the UMLS Semantic Network), that the expression 
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DLs are preferred for many purposes over FOL, which 
is considerably more expressive than DLs but falls short 
of decidability. 
• DLs have increasingly been employed in biomedi-
cal terminologies. After the GALEN project in the nine-
ties (Rector, 1997), a pioneering effort in the large-scale 
use of a logic-based formalism for medical domain rep-
resentation and reasoning, the currently most significant 
example of the use of DLs is the clinical terminology 
SNOMED CT (IHTSDO, 2009), which contains more 
than 300,000 classes. OWL DL is also increasingly used 
as a representation language for OBO Foundry ontologies 
(SMITH et al., 2007). 
To use DLs properly, one has to understand their 
basic building blocks, represented by terms like “class”, 
“relation”, and “individual”, and also understand how 
their constituent logical symbols and expressions are inter-
preted. For example, all past, present, and future individual 
hands in the world are instances of the class Hand. Binary 
relations (“object properties” in OWL DL) have pairs of 
individuals as their extensions (PATEL-SCHNEIDER et 
al., 2004), e.g., the pair constituted by the first author’s 
right thumb and his right hand. Classes in DL are always 
distinct from individuals; classes of classes are not allowed. 
OWL DL object properties express binary relations with-
out any direct reference to time. This is a major drawback 
from an ontological (and biological) point of view1, since 
we often need to attach time-indexes to assertions about 
individuals. For example it is necessary for many purposes 
to make it explicit that an individual belongs to the class 
Embryo at t1 and to the class Fetus at t2. 
One also has to be careful to recognize that the 
same expressions may be interpreted in different ways 
in different disciplines. For instance, a statement to the 
effect that all hands have thumbs is limited to the do-
main of normal (so-called canonical) human anatomy. It 
clearly does not hold if the domain includes injured or 
malformed humans, or humans in early embryonic states 
(SCHULZ et al., 2008; NEUHAUS et al., 2007). 
In the following, we illustrate the DL syntax and se-
mantics through a set of increasingly complex examples. 
To start, we take a look at the class Liver. When we intro-
duce this class, we define its extension to be the set of all 
livers of all organisms at all times. In the same vein, the 
class Bodily_Organ then extends to all individual bodily 
organs at all times. To relate the two classes, we introduce 
the key concept of taxonomic subsumption: The class 
Liver is a subclass (subtype) of the class Bodily_Organ. In 
DL notation, this is expressed by the ⊑ operator:
Liver ⊑ Bodily_Organ
and the relation in question is commonly referred to as 
the is_a relation. 
In contrast, the instantiation relation instance_of 
(∈) links individuals to the classes of which they are 
the instances. For example, each individual liver is an 
instance of the class Liver, so the (individual) liver 
of the first author of this paper is one specific in-
stance_of Liver. It is noteworthy that DLs do not allow 
a distinction to be expressed between an individual’s 
membership in a class on the one hand and an indi-
vidual instantiation of a universal or type on the other 
hand. Both are represented by means of the instance_of 
relation (∈).
More complex statements can be obtained by using 
operators and quantifiers. In the following example we 
use both the ⊓ (“and”) operator and add a quantified 
role, using the existential quantifier ∃ (“exists”). The 
expression
Inflammatory_Disease ⊓ ∃has_location.Liver
then denotes the class of all instances that belong to 
the class Inflammatory_Disease and are further related 
through the relation has_location to some instance of the 
class Liver.
This example actually gives us both the necessary 
and the sufficient conditions needed in order to fully 
define the class Hepatitis: 
Hepatitis ≡ Inflammatory_Disease ⊓ ∃has_location.Liver
The equivalence operator ≡ in this formula tells that: 
(i) each particular instance of hepatitis is an instance of 
inflammatory disease that is located at some liver, and 
also (ii) that everything that is an instance of inflamma-
tory disease that is located at some liver is an instance of 
hepatitis. Hence, in any situation, the term on the left 
can be replaced by the expression on the right without 
any loss of meaning.
Note that when we express such an equivalence 
statement, this statement has to hold at all times with-
out exception. Therefore we cannot use statements of 
this form to express, for instance, that hepatitis has the 
symptom fever in most (but not in all) cases. We could, of 
course, form the expression 
Hepatitis ≡ Inflammation ⊓ ∃has_location.Liver ⊓ 
∃normally_has_symptom.Fever
In virtue of the DL interpretation of the existential 
quantifier, however, this assertion implies that for every 
instance of the class Hepatitis (without exception) there 
also exists some instance of Fever. The word normally 
in the property name normally_has_symptom can be 
interpreted by humans, but it plays no logical role at 
all. This is clearly not in accordance with the intended 
meaning.
Such logical effects are important, since errors arise 
when they are not taken into account by users of DL 
formalisms. Abundant instances of such errors can be 
found in the current version of SNOMED CT. Its concept 
Biopsy_Planned (ID: 183993008), for example, is related 
to the concept Biopsy as follows:
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Biopsy_Planned ⊑ Situation ⊓ ∃associated_procedure.
Biopsy ⊓ …
This expression states that for each planned biopsy 
(we assume that this is the meaning of Biopsy_Planned) 
there always exists at least one instance of an actual 
biopsy, which certainly cannot be what is intended, 
since not all plans for biopsies are realized. SNOMED 
CT also has the class Drug_Abuse_Prevention (ID: 
408941008):
Drug_Abuse_Prevention ⊑ Procedure ⊓ ∃has_focus.
Drug_Abuse 
Correctly interpreted, this expression states, quite 
absurdly, that whenever an act of drug abuse preven-
tion is performed, then it is related to some instance of 
drug abuse.
These two examples illustrate how easy it is to cre-
ate statements with unintended meanings when using 
even very simple DLs. The reason such examples are so 
common in current biomedical terminologies is that the 
ontology developers are often domain experts who are 
not familiar with the complexities of formal logic and 
pay too little attention to the principles of sound ontol-
ogy development. They tend to be guided, rather, by the 
superficial simplicity of such statements, and thus do 
not realize that their logical interpretation contradicts 
the intended meaning. The resultant invalid statements 
then provide support for invalid inferences when used 
in automated reasoning.
It is clear however that there is a need for classes 
such as Biopsy_Plan or Drug_Abuse_Prevention. Because 
any non-negated use of existentially quantified roles in 
a DL formalism corresponds to a statement of the form 
“for all … there is some …”, we must resort to so-called 
value restrictions if we are to bring about the needed ef-
fect. This means that the quantifier ∀ is used in such a 
way as to specify the allowed range for a given relation. 
We could then (correctly) state the following:
Biopsy_Plan ⊑ Plan ⊓ ∀has_realization.Biopsy
In plain words, this expression states that a biopsy 
plan is a plan that – if realized – can be realized only by 
some instance of Biopsy. In contrast to the simple exis-
tential statements, this does not say that some Biopsy 
must exist for each Biopsy_Plan. Similar constructs are 
needed for other realizable entities, such as functions, 
roles, and dispositions (GRENON, 2003).
By using the universal quantifier ∀, however, we 
move away from simple but scalable DL dialects like EL 
(BAADER et al., 2007) to DLs with a computational 
complexity that poses severe problems for large ontologies 
like SNOMED CT. It is even more complicated to define 
classes like Drug_Abuse_Prevention with the appropriate 
logical rigor. Here we need to say that if some abuse pre-
vention procedure is applied, then this causes a state in 
the organism that precludes the organism to participate in 
Drug_Abuse. So in order to express this properly, we need 
to introduce the negation operator ¬ as follows:
Drug_Abuse_Prevention ≡ Procedure ⊓ ∃has_participant.
Person ⊓ ∃causes.(State ⊓ ∃has_participant.(Person ⊓ 
∃participates_in. ¬ Drug_Abuse))
In this definition the class Person is instantiated 
twice. Unfortunately it is not specified that the two 
instances are identical, which they would have to be for 
the assertion to do its job. There is, however, no DL able 
to express the fact that they are identical, for this would 
require the full expressive powers of FOL with equality, 
and thus a move beyond the realm of decidability.
Other cases of medical terms that exceed the expres-
siveness of decidable description logics include expressions 
involving “without”, such as “concussion of the brain with-
out loss of consciousness” as discussed in (BODENREIDER 
et al., 2004; CEUSTERS et al., 2007; SCHULZ et al., 
2008). Such expressions are highly relevant and important 
in medicine. Yet their representation is intricate, not only 
due to their demand for expressive logical constructors, 
but also due to the difficulty of gaining univocal agreement 
upon their meaning, which would involve taking into ac-
count tacit assumptions for example relating to time. 
The above examples clearly demonstrate the dilemma 
of logic-based representations: If the purpose is to logi-
cally encode and classify large terminological systems like 
SNOMED CT (BAADER et al., 2006), then the set of 
allowed constructors must be limited, since value restric-
tions and negations lead to computational intractability. 
Some (RECTOR et al., 2008) nonetheless stress that it is 
important to include even computationally more expensive 
constructs so that adequate domain representations are 
not precluded. An alternative strategy is to distinguish the 
constructs contained within the terminology from their use 
in specific sentential contexts, where negation and other 
terms (such as “on examination”) are properly at home.
Categories of domain representation
As should by now be clear, it is often not possible 
with computable, logic-based domain representation 
formalisms, like DLs, to truthfully represent important 
aspects of biomedical knowledge. Many types of asser-
tions require other means of representation. We thus 
propose to distinguish between different categories of 
domain representation. We shall show that these call 
for distinct sorts of treatment even though they have 
often been treated within formal ontologies as if they 
were similar. Our interest in keeping these categories 
apart is to highlight the fact that each representation 
requires its own formalisms with its own semantics and 
that inadequate use of undifferentiated representation 
formalisms leads to unwanted results. As a result of our 
discussion, we also aim to contribute to a more clear-cut 
understanding of what formal ontologies can and cannot 
accomplish in the biomedical domain.
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Lexico-semantic representation 
We use the term “lexico-semantic representation” 
to refer to thesauri, semantic lexicons and similar rep-
resentational artifacts centered on the meanings of the 
expressions found in natural language. Typically, they 
address both the fact that one lexical entry may have 
two or more meanings (as illustrated by the polysemy 
of terms such as “patient” or “lead”), and the fact that 
one meaning may be expressed by one or more lexicon 
entries (for example the synonymy of “hyperthermia” 
and “fever”). They may also contain word or term 
translations. Thesauri and semantic lexicons may further 
contain semantic relations between the individual lexicon 
entries such as broader_than or narrower_than. WordNet 
(FELLBAUM, 1998), MeSH, and most parts of the 
UMLS Metathesaurus (NLMb, 2008) are examples for 
such representation systems, which have a long tradition 
in library science, where literature retrieval as a widely 
accepted use case. 
The question of how lexico-semantic relations 
such as synonymy should be correctly expressed is 
not in fact an issue to be addressed by ontologies, as 
ontologies describe real entities independently of the 
symbols and formalisms of human language used to 
denote them. Therefore, relations such as broader_than 
or narrower_than, which are semantically arbitrary sub-
classification relations (OBRST, 2006) characterizing 
the MeSH thesaurus or WordNet, are fundamentally 
different from the subclass (is_a) relation that defines 
the taxonomy backbone of a properly constructed 
ontology. As an example, in MeSH we can find both 
Plasma narrower_than Blood and Fetal_Blood narrower_than 
Blood although, from an ontological point of view, the 
relations involved here are fundamentally different. In 
the first case, we are dealing with a parthood (part_of) 
relation, in the second with a case of the subtype (is_a) 
relation. This difference may not matter in the relevant 
context since the narrower_than relation, even though 
semantically ill-defined, fits perfectly well with current 
needs of literature indexing and retrieval. Articles on 
blood plasma are as relevant to a query on “blood” as 
are articles on fetal blood. It may, however, be vitally 
important in other contexts.
Problems arise already at the present stage of in-
formation retrieval when it is proposed to “ontologize” 
MeSH simply by mapping all narrower_than relations to 
taxonomic subsumption relations (SOUALMIA et al., 
2004) such as Plasma ⊑ Blood and Fetal_Blood ⊑ Blood. For 
while the result is a seemingly perfect subsumption graph 
that can be easily processed by standard DL tools, this 
exercise once again creates typical cases of unintended 
models, since it ignores the true meaning of subsump-
tion. Errors such as classifying plasma as a kind of blood 
are then the result.
While lexico-semantic relations have certain fea-
tures in common with the ontological relations between 
entities in reality, the construction of an ontology out 
of a thesaurus requires numerous additional assump-
tions, for example concerning quantification. Hence, 
an automated conversion process cannot provide 
anything more than a raw sketch that requires careful 
manual elaboration and curation before it can be of 
any serious utility for inference purposes (SCHULZ 
et al., 2001).
Although we see lexicons or term lists as lying out-
side the realm of formal ontology, we want to stress that 
virtually all formal ontology applications require a link 
between ontology classes and lexical items. However, 
we advocate that these two issues should be treated by 
the two separate artifacts of formal ontologies on the 
one hand, and lexico-semantic representations on the 
other.
Representation of types of entities
Scientific realism postulates the existence of an 
objective reality that can be studied by science and about 
which we can discover truths (BOYD, 2002). A proper 
scientific theory, and hence a proper ontology, will in-
clude assertions to the effect that entities instantiating a 
given class stand in given relations to entities instantiat-
ing some other given class. Such assertions can of course 
rest on error and thus they must be capable of being 
revised at every stage. When formalized logically they 
may in addition rest on metaphysical presuppositions of 
different sorts, for example theories based on three- and 
four-dimensionalist approaches, But scientific realism as 
described here is compatible with a wide range of such 
theories. While the realist view is still controversial and 
not shared by all ontology developers (SMITH et al., 
2006), it has a number of practical advantages. Thus, 
for example, it allows a view of ontologies as providing 
a canon of axiomatic assertions about simple relations 
between the most scientifically basic types of entities, 
which can then be taken for granted in further, more 
complex types of work. Examples of such assertions are 
“cells have membranes”, “hearts have cavities”, “every 
case of hepatitis is located in a liver”, “every aspirin tablet 
contains salicylate”, and so on. 
It is useful to produce artifacts that will afford com-
putationally amenable automated reasoning on the basis 
of such assertions, as demonstrated above. However, this 
is not identical with the attempt of producing formal 
theories that aim at characterizing a domain in reality. 
In practical ontology engineering, these two objectives 
have to be reconciled. Experience in use of the Gene 
Ontology supports the thesis that features of reality 
can often be sufficiently well represented even through 
a relatively simple logic. However, as will be clear from 
our discussions of DLs above, we must thereby always 
bear in mind that such formalisms do not possess the 
richness necessary to create complete definitions in many 
cases. The necessary expressiveness conflicts with the 
need to construct computationally tractable models. It 
must therefore be accepted that ontologies (like scientific 
theories) provide only partial representations of reality. 
They state what is considered to be true of all instances 
of given classes: “There is no hepatitis outside the liver”; 
“there is no NaCl solution without chloride ions”; “there 
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is no cell without a cell membrane”. But it becomes quite 
clear that such statements constitute only a minor por-
tion of the knowledge that may be required to adequately 
capture a domain. As Rector (2008) expresses it, “There 
are very few interesting items of knowledge that are truly 
ontological in this strict sense.” Yet it is also evident that 
such items are nonetheless crucially important since they 
form the basis for all reasoning both by human beings 
and by computer applications.
Furthermore, it has been largely ignored that do-
main representation of ths kind (statements about what 
is true of all instances of a class) are also present in 
numerous artifacts that are seldom identified as ontolo-
gies. UniProt, a large, central repository (“database”) of 
protein data (UNIPROT, 2008), is a typical example. 
Under ontological scrutiny, most of its content describes 
protein types (and not individuals) in terms of what is 
universally true for every single protein molecule of this 
type. We therefore consider these kinds of representation, 
too, as essentially ontological in nature.
Representation of background knowledge
The term “background knowledge” as used by 
Rector (2008) encompasses default knowledge, pre-
sumptive knowledge, and probabilistic knowledge, and 
refers to all kinds of statements that are assumed to be 
at least typically (but not necessarily universally) true 
in some domain and in some context. Such knowledge 
is traditionally conveyed through scientific textbooks 
in a highly context-dependent fashion, often invoking 
prototypical assertions, for example, concerning the 
relationship between diseases, signs and symptoms, or 
between adverse effects and drugs, which are expressed 
in terms of qualitative probabilities. 
Familiarity with this background knowledge, rather 
than familiarity with the knowledge that can be con-
veyed using formal ontologies, distinguishes an expert 
from a novice, just as it marks the difference in content 
between a textbook and a dictionary. The examples 
below highlight how formal ontology approaches and 
logical representation formalisms reach their limits when 
it comes to representing this kind of knowledge. Using 
DL-based formalisms for even simplified accounts of 
prototypical knowledge tends to lead to flawed results. 
There exist other logical formalisms capable of expressing 
this kind of knowledge, but again those formalisms are 
computationally expensive in ways which go beyond the 
bounds of decidability.
Default knowledge
One type of background knowledge is default 
knowledge (Rector, 2004; Hoehndorf et al., 2007). This 
is knowledge concerned with what can be assumed to be 
typically true in the absence of contravening evidence. 
DL does not give us the means to state what is typically 
true. But especially with regard to canonical anatomy vs. 
clinical anatomy (SMITH et al., 2005), one would like 
to state for example that hands normally have thumbs. 
A statement such as
Hand ⊑ ∃has_proper_part.Thumb
does not appropriately account for this. It states that 
every hand has a thumb and rules out the possibility of 
a hand without a thumb; that is, it rules out non-proto-
typical hands (e.g. after accidents).
Meta classes
Other statements of background knowledge are 
meta-statements concerning classes. They hold true when 
viewed as assertions about classes as wholes, but become 
false when viewed as assertions about instances. The DL 
view is that all statements about classes are statements 
about the corresponding sets of instances. When this is ig-
nored, seemingly obvious subsumption statements like:
Diabetes_Mellitus ⊑ Frequent_Disease
Malnutrition_Related_Diabetes_Mellitus ⊑ Diabetes_Mel-
litus
lead to false conclusions, for example that
Malnutrition_Related_Diabetes_Mellitus ⊑ Frequent_Disease
The problem here is here that a feature concerning the 
size of the extension of a class (the number of its instances) 
is erroneously taken as an inheritable property. In the 
above, the symbol ⊑ (is_a) is used in two logically distinct 
senses, of which only the second is sanctioned by DLs. The 
resultant so-called is_a overloading has been identified as a 
typical error that occurs when building ontologies in an un-
principled way (GUARINO, 1999; Welty and GUARINO, 
2001; SMITH et al., 2004). It involves indiscriminately 
interpreting natural language expressions containing “is a” 
as representing a single ontological subclass relation.  
Dispositions
Encoding non-trivial facts in formal ontologies may 
require complicated additional constructs, such as the 
addition of representations of dispositions to convey in-
formation about potentialities. It is important to note that 
dispositions can exist without ever being realized and even 
without our being able to specify the precise conditions in 
which they are realized (JANSEN, 2007). An analgesic drug 
is a substance that has a disposition to treat pain. But it will 
realize this disposition only when administered in a certain 
way to a certain sort of patient. We can represent the class 
of processes of treating (a patient) for pain with:
Treating ⊓ ∃ has_participant.Pain
We can then represent the class of dispositions 
realized when pain is treated:
Disposition ⊓∀ has_realization.(Treating ⊓ ∃ has_partici-
pant.Pain)
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The following definition now declares an Anal-
gesic_Drug to be a substance in which this disposition 
inheres:
Analgesic_Drug ≡ Substance ⊓ ∃ bearer_of.(Disposition ⊓ ∀ 
has_realization.(Treating ⊓ ∃ has_participant.Pain))
Such constructions can strongly affect the scalability 
of an ontology implementation, since a larger set of such 
expressions, e.g., for representing the pharmacodynamics 
of substances, cannot be handled efficiently by current 
reasoning algorithms.
Data in context
The body of scientific and clinical assertions is not 
restricted to the expression of default assumptions and 
dispositional features. It also includes uncertain asser-
tions, for instance, concerning the effect of a drug in 
treating a given disease, or concerning the existence of 
a suspected risk factor for a certain condition. For the 
aforementioned reasons, the encoding of such assertions 
in formal ontologies can be very demanding and it is 
actually questionable whether such assertions should be 
encoded in a formal ontology in the first place.
As an example, an ontology is being created in the 
context of the European Union project @neurIST as 
a basis for the semantic mediation and integration of 
data in the area of brain aneurysms and subarachnoidal 
bleedings (BOEKER et al., 2007). The data within the 
project originate from a multitude of sources and show 
a high degree of fragmentation and heterogeneity both 
in format and scale. The ontology needs to represent 
all relevant types of entities and also respect the dif-
ferent views of these entities on the part of those in 
different disciplines such as medicine or epidemiology. 
To do justice to all these aspects, the ontology applies 
dispositional statements in the formulation of class 
definitions and is split into two parts: (i) an ontology in 
the proper sense of the word and (ii) a set of represen-
tational artifacts capturing context-specific knowledge 
about certain facts, e.g., risk factors in clinical contexts. 
(A similar approach is also pursued by the Ontology of 
Biomedical Investigations (OBI) (OBI, 2008).) In the 
@neurIST ontology, the class Hypertensive_Disease is a 
subclass of Biological_Process_or_State that is associated 
with High_Blood_Pressure and causes some Rupture_Dispo-
sition, i.e., a disposition to the effect that an aneurysm 
will burst. This disposition is then further connected 
to the class (and thus identified as a) Risk_Factor for 
Aneurysm_Rupture in that this latter class is also defined 
to be such that its instances cause some instance of 
Rupture_Disposition:
Rupture_Disposition ≡ Predisposition_to_Disease ⊓  ∀ 
has_realization.Aneurysm_Rupture
Risk_Factor_for_Aneurysm_Rupture ⊑ Risk_Factor ⊓ ∃ 
causes.Rupture_Disposition 
The following assertion is crucial to the study of 
aneurysms but transgresses the limits of formal ontology. 
It is incomplete in the sense that the constraints that 
are contextually defined and which make this statement 
valid are missing:
Hypertensive_Disease ⊑ Risk_Factor_for_Aneurysm_
Rupture 
The above is an attempt to state that hypertensive 
disease is in some generic sense a risk factor. Hypertensive 
disease is a risk factor for cerebral aneurysms, but only 
under certain circumstances. What we want to express 
is capture the precise nature of the correlation between 
the two while of course recognizing that there are other 
risk factors as well. 
These examples show the sorts of steps which would 
have to be taken in order for a DL framework to be extended 
in such a way as to account for certain kinds of background 
knowledge, thus gaining the advantage of DL reasoning 
support without incurring the risk of unintended models.
However, the difficulty of representing all the hid-
den assumptions underlying background knowledge 
(and the performance problems that result from using 
the needed rich logic) may suggest that we use instead a 
much simpler triple-based representation as mentioned 
in the introductory section, and devise special reason-
ing devices to fit. Alternatively one might resort to a 
broad range of knowledge representation artifacts such 
as default logics (REITER, 1980), frames (MINSKY, 
1974), F-logic (KIFER et al., 1989), and several kinds 
of computationally expensive DL extensions (BAADER, 
2007, ch. 6). The resultant knowledge representation 
artifacts, however, are not formal ontologies as we use this 
term. Still, one can and should reuse the classes formally 
defined in an ontology as symbols in these formalisms, 
along the lines pointed out in our examples above. 
Representation of individuals 
Whereas the first three types of representation de-
scribed above make generalizations about all entities of 
some given kind, much of medicine involves descriptions 
of individual entities, such as the tumor of patient A, a 
certain lab test performed on a certain day in hospital B, a 
treatment episode as documented in patient record C, or 
the occurrence of a specific disease in a given patient group 
D. Disciplines like epidemiology and public health deal 
similarly with specific political and geographical entities 
such as Brazil, New Orleans, the Southern Pacific Islands, or 
the upper Rio Negro region.
Statements of individual facts can be expressed in 
a straightforward manner in DL terms as instantiations 
of corresponding classes, or in other words, as so-called 
A-box assertions (with the letter “A” standing for “asser-
tions”), as contrasted with the T-box component of DLs 
which capture what is called “terminological knowledge” 
(or perhaps better called “knowledge pertaining to 
types”). Consider for example,
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Hepatitis_162726 ∈ Hepatitis
which asserts that a particular disease (case) is an in-
stance of hepatitis. 
A molecular interaction statement such as “Lmo-2 
interacts with Elf-2” as typically found in a scientific 
article typically rests on assertions about certain individu-
als, namely two portions of Lmo-2 and Elf-2 (containing 
instances of molecules of the corresponding types), that 
have been observed to exhibit some interaction in some 
specific experimental assay (SCHULZ et al., 2008). 
We can describe a particular interaction event in 
which the two substance portions under scrutiny par-
ticipate as follows:
Lmo-2.7760102 ∈ Portion_of_Lmo-2
Elf-2.776010 ∈ Portion_of_Elf-2
 Interaction.725322 ∈ Interaction 
has_participant (Interaction.725322, Lmo-2.7760102)
has_participant (Interaction.725322, Elf-2.776010)
There are domains like geography, in which indi-
viduals, not classes, constitute the primary targets of 
knowledge. Any detailed description of geographic or 
political divisions of the sort that would be of interest, 
for example, for epidemiology or public health, abounds 
in references to particular entities which instantiate 
only a small number of classes (SMITH et al., 2005). 
For instance, a complete political division of the U.S. 
can be created on the basis of four nested levels (with 
one instance of countries, 50 instances of states, 3,077 
instances of counties, and over 50,000 instances of 
municipalities) (see also geographic entities in GAZ (GE-
NOMICS STANDARD CONSORTIUM, 2008)). Note 
the difference in representation compared to anatomical 
divisions in Table 4.
Table 4 - Example partonomies in geography and anatomy
Orlando ∈ Municipality
Orange County ∈ County
Florida ∈ State
USA ∈ Country
<Orlando, Orange County> ∈ proper_part_of
<Orange County, Florida> ∈ proper_part_of
<Florida, USA> ∈ proper_part_of
Thumb ⊑ Digit
Hand ⊑ Body_Part
Upper_Extremity ⊑ Limb
Body ⊑ Anatomical_Structure
Thumb ⊑ ∃ proper_part_of.Hand
Hand ⊑ ∃ proper_part_of.Upper_Extremity
Upper_Extremity ⊑ ∃ proper_part_of.Body
This example shows that assertions concerning 
classes differ formally from assertions about individuals. 
In DL, however, the employed relations are the same, 
because DLs do not allow special relations that relate 
classes. Logically relating classes always requires the use 
of quantifiers, which are not needed in assertions relating 
individuals. This explains why, prior to any logic-based 
representation, it must be made clear whether the entities 
under scrutiny are classes or individuals. But especially 
in the field of molecular biology this is not trivial at all. 
Thus, our assertion example “Lmo-2 interacts with Elf-2” 
can be perfectly well understood as a universal statement 
concerning the class of Lmo-2 molecules and thus as ex-
pressing dispositional knowledge along the lines of: 
All Lmo-2 molecules have the disposition to interact 
with Elf-2 molecules.
There are good arguments to be made on behalf of 
either reading, and so disambiguation cannot be affected 
without first analyzing the context in which the utter-
ance is being made.
In practice, the individual/class boundary is often 
drawn in an idiosyncratic way. For example, UniProt 
entries are asserted to denote “instances” of the class 
protein. A computer scientist might contend that this 
choice of terminology is mainly motivated by the view 
the modeler has of a domain: “Deciding whether a par-
ticular concept is a class in an ontology or an individual 
instance depends on what the potential applications of 
the ontology are.” (NOY and MCGUINNESS, 2001). 
France, on this reading, may be conceived either as a class 
or an instance depending upon the needs of particular 
ontology developers. We believe, however, that no arbi-
trariness should be involved in the distinction between 
this particular cell in this particular test tube here and 
now (an instance), and Cell (a class). Moreover, encourag-
ing the supposition that there is such arbitrariness has 
the potential to lead to a forking of representations which 
will hamper the very interoperability of data resources 
that ontologies are intended to support.
Indeed we contend that a formal ontological analysis 
can be coherent only on the basis of a view of the distinc-
tion between individuals and classes as an unalterable 
distinction obtaining on the side of the entities themselves. 
Individuals on the one hand exist in space and time; they 
do not stand to each other in subsumption relations; they 
can be referred to by proper names and (in many cases) 
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photographed. Classes on the other hand do not exist in 
space and time; they stand in subsumption relations; and 
they can be referred to by common nouns. Whether an en-
tity is a particular or a class or type is thus not a matter of 
choice on the part of modelers, and, in our experience, the 
controversial cases which seem to suggest such optionality 
always reveal upon closer inspection hidden ambiguities or 
inadequacies of software frameworks. Some defenders of 
the view that the human MPDU-1 gene is an instance of 
the class Gene, refer to genes as instances of information 
content entities. The same genetic information entity can 
be encoded in different nucleic acid macromolecules, just 
as the same text can be disseminated in many hard copies. 
Others, however, claim that the human MPDU-1 gene 
is not an instance but a subclass of the class gene; they 
are then referring to genes as types of macromolecular 
sequences, the instances of which are the real nucleotide 
sequences replicated in the cells of our bodies.
As we already saw in the section on background 
knowledge, an implicit reference to individuals underlies 
probabilistic statements, which are very characteristic in 
biomedical discourse. An example is the following state-
ment: “In 2000, worldwide prevalence of diabetes mellitus 
was 2.8%”. Here we have two classes, viz. Human and (case 
of) Human_Diabetes. Both classes have a cardinality (inte-
ger value), and the prevalence is given by their ratio. The 
prevalence is therefore not a characteristic of the disease 
but of the population of persons who have a case of the 
disease. We here extend the DL notation by symbolizing 
the cardinality of the extension of a class (i.e., the number 
of instances) by enclosing the class name in “||”.
Human ⊑ Object
Diabetic_Human ≡ Human ⊓ ∃ bearer_of.Diabetes_Mellitus 
|Diabetic_Human|/|Human| = 0.028
 
This demonstrates that probabilistic background 
knowledge could be expressed by DL A-boxes extended 
by arithmetic operators (referring to individuals). This 
is however not in the scope of formal ontologies, just as 
little as are alternative approaches such as probabilistic 
T-Box extensions (KOLLER, 1997; KLINOV, 2008). 
Moreover, the assertions in question cannot be expressed 
with currently available DL resources. 
Discussion and Conclusion
The discipline of knowledge representation evolved 
in the context of artificial intelligence research with the 
purpose of enabling computers to draw new conclusions 
from existing data and information. When the term 
“ontologies” became popular in computer science in the 
nineties, it was thus often regarded as a new catchword 
for something that already existed, namely knowledge 
representation artifacts. However, two strands of research 
have evolved since, demonstrating the need for a more 
principled methodology.
First, Description Logics (DLs) were developed by 
delineating and investigating fragments of First Order 
Logics (FOL) that are sufficiently expressive to allow the 
formulation of assertions about classes of individuals as 
well as their relations in such a way that new theorems 
could be derived automatically. This required a well–de-
fined semantics calling basically for a bipartition into 
classes and individuals; it demanded also a formal ac-
count of subsumption and of role quantification. While 
in more primitive, semantic network style representations 
such as the UMLS Metathesaurus, all statements – such 
as “aspirin is a salicylate”, “aspirin contains an aromatic 
ring”, and “aspirin prevents myocardial infarction” – look 
quite similar, attempts at more formal representation 
reveal fundamental differences. Using description log-
ics, the first statement is straightforward and does not 
require any relation beyond that of subclass, the second 
requires a quantified role expression, whereas the third 
cannot be adequately represented at all.
Secondly, in parallel to the evolution of representa-
tional languages like OWL, philosophers and computer 
scientists confronted the history-laden discipline of phil-
osophical ontology with the requirements of the modern 
information society and created the discipline of applied 
ontology (GUARINO, 1998). Biomedicine became a 
testbed for the convergence of DLs and applied ontology. 
The OBO Foundry effort, and increasingly the redesign 
activities of SNOMED CT, bear witness thereto. 
We can now summarize the results of this paper by 
means of the crude delimitation of four kinds of repre-
sentation we have introduced above, namely: (i) lexico-
semantic representation, (ii) representation of types of 
entities, (iii) representation of background knowledge, 
and (iv) representation of individuals.
(i) These are the sorts of statements we find in much 
of the UMLS, as well as in WordNet and similar artifacts, 
which strive to represent the terminological component 
of a domain. They do this by means of relations such 
as synonymy, polysemy, broader than, narrower than, drawn 
from the realm of thesauri and semantic lexicons. We ar-
gue that this approach is useful for information retrieval 
but not for inference or for knowledge integration.
(ii) At the opposite extreme are the sorts of state-
ments we find in formal ontologies formulated in logics, 
where formal rigor and inferential power is achieved 
at the price of constraints on expressiveness along a 
number of dimensions. These constraints may fall short 
of meeting the requirements of users who often expect 
from a domain ontology more than a repository of basic 
truisms. On the other hand, such truisms are indispens-
able as a foundation for the more adequate formulation 
of other sorts of statements, not least in the context of 
reasoning systems. 
(iii) This group of statements constitutes what 
we call “background knowledge”, a matter of loose as-
sociations between classes which cannot be expressed 
by the “for all … some” statement scheme typical of 
DLs. These can to some degree be ontologized by in-
troducing classes of dispositions and other realizable 
entities. However their introduction occurs at the price 
of increased complexity. There are other approaches to 
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the representation of background knowledge, including 
default logic (REITER, 1980), frames (KIFER et al., 
1989), and several kinds of computationally expensive 
DL extensions (BAADER, 2007, ch. 6). A general recom-
mendation cannot be made as to which of these or other 
alternatives is appropriate however. This depends heavily 
on the specific application domain and the specific use 
case for which reasoning services are needed. 
(iv) The final set of statements concerns the 
representation of individuals. This might be seen as a 
minor issue in, for instance, yeast biology, but is of great 
importance in a domain such as medicine, which is con-
cerned to record information about human beings and 
populations. We showed, for example, that probabilistic 
statements concerning disease prevalence are assertions 
not about classes but rather about individuals.
Table 5 recapitulates the examples given in Table 
2 at the beginning of the article and assigns each of 
them to one of the different categories of knowledge we 
introduced above.
Table 5 - UMLS Metathesaurus-style (mrrel table) assertions and associated domain 
representation categories
Concept / Term 1
(Object, Subject)
Relation
(Attribute, Predicate)
Concept / Term 2
(Value, Object)
Domain representation 
Category
Aspirin prevents Myocardial_Infarction BK
Aspirin is_a Sacicylate ONT
Aspirin has_part Aromatic_Ring ONT
Blood_Plasma narrower_than Blood LS
Cancer causes Weight_Loss BK
Cell has_part Cell_Membrane ONT
Contraceptive_Measure prevents Pregnancy BK
Diabetes_Mellitus is_a Frequent_Disease BK
Diabetes_Mellitus has_prevalence 2.8% BK
Diclofenac has_side_effect Gastrointestinal_Bleeding BK
Diphteria is_a Rare_Disease BK
ELM-2 interacts_with LMO-2 BK, INS
ELM-2 is_a Protein ONT
Fever symptom_of Malaria_Tropica BK
Hand has_part Thumb ONT
Hepatitis has_location Liver ONT
Hepatitis has_translation Hepatite LS
Hypertension is_a Cardiovascular_Risk_Factor BK
Hyperthermia has_synonym Fever LS
Liver is_a Bodily_Organ ONT
NaCl_Solution has_part Cloride_Ion ONT
Pharyngitis has_symptom Hyperthermia BK
Smoking causes Cancer BK
THC is_a Schedule_III_Controlled_Drug BK
Thumb has_part Thumbnail ONT
WHO located_in Geneva INS
(BK = background knowledge, INS = instances, LS = lexico-semantic representation, ONT = ontological level)
Our distinctions coincide to some degree with those 
proposed by OBRST (2006) in the Ontology Spectrum. 
Our first category corresponds to Obrst’s “weak taxono-
mies and thesauri” and the second to logical theories 
(“strong ontologies”). The “weak ontologies” category in 
the Ontology Spectrum integrates aspects from both of 
these, and is used in data modeling (UML) rather than 
for domain representation. While Obrst mentions the 
class vs. instance distinction in his portrayal of strong 
ontologies, the distinction is not further elaborated.
Our main thesis in the above is that knowledge rep-
resentation – which might more properly be referred to 
as the modeling of beliefs among scientists – is not a task 
of formal ontologies. Nor do formal ontologies describe 
entities properly belonging to the domain of human 
language. These two kinds of representational artifact 
represent different things, serve different purposes and use 
different formalisms. We postulate that a clearer under-
standing of these differences will facilitate the definition 
of more robust and useful interfaces between them, and 
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thereby reduce the occurrence of unintended models and 
thus help to create a more rational basis for semantically 
interoperable systems in biology and medicine. 
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Note
1. A “workaround” exists to represent n-ary relations in 
OWL via reification - see http://www.w3.org/TR/swbp-
n-aryRelations
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